Sexual Conflict Over Egg Allocation: A Dynamic Programming Approach to Modeling the Evolution of Male Harm and Female Resistance by Kelley, David
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone 
Projects 
Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone 
Projects 
Spring 5-1-2007 
Sexual Conflict Over Egg Allocation: A Dynamic Programming 
Approach to Modeling the Evolution of Male Harm and Female 
Resistance 
David Kelley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone 
 Part of the Other Computer Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kelley, David, "Sexual Conflict Over Egg Allocation: A Dynamic Programming Approach to Modeling the 
Evolution of Male Harm and Female Resistance" (2007). Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone 
Projects. 571. 
https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone/571 
This Honors Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Syracuse University Honors Program 
Capstone Projects at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone 
Projects by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
 1 
Introduction 
 Differential investment in gametes and an asymmetry in relatedness make 
sexual conflict a frequent outcome of sexual reproduction (Arnqvist and Rowe 
2005; Parker 1979; Trivers 1972). Recent empirical studies have shown that 
sexual interactions can prove harmful to females (e.g., Blanckenhorn et al. 2002; 
Chapman et al. 1995; Crudgington and Siva-Jothy 2000; Morrow and Arnqvist 
2003; Pitnick and GarcíaGonzález 2002).  The adaptive significance of male traits 
that inflict harm on females has been a point of contention. 
Harm to females may represent an unavoidable, negative pleiotropic 
consequence of a trait that otherwise benefits males (i.e., enhanced competitive 
fertilization success; Morrow et al. 2003; Parker 1979).  Arnqvist and Rowe 
(2005) present a verbal model as to why this scenario presents the most likely 
general explanation for the origin and maintenance of harmful male traits. 
Alternatively, two theoretical models address mechanisms by which inflicting 
harm per se may be beneficial to males.  The first model links an increase in male 
harm to a reduction in the probability of a female remating, and consequently a 
reduction in the risk of encountering sperm competition (Johnstone and Keller 
2000).  The second model contends that females respond to injury, and the 
concomitant reduction in survival prospects, by reallocating resources away from 
somatic maintenance (and future reproduction) and into current reproduction, thus 
siring more offspring with the harmful male (Lessells 1999, 2005; Michiels 
1998). 
Females of iterparous species are expected to evolve resource allocation 
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strategies that maximize their lifetime fitness (Roff 2002; Stearns 1992). 
Resources must be allocated among growth, maintenance and reproduction, with 
current reproductive effort influenced by the relative value of current reproduction 
to future expectations of reproduction (Gadgil and Bossert 1970; Michod 1979; 
Williams 1966).  Selection to optimally allocate resources to reproductive effort 
might result in a population of females with a progeny production schedule that is 
either invariable across females or else varies with genetic quality but is otherwise 
not adjustable (i.e. fixed clutch size).  Alternatively, females may evolve a plastic 
breeding schedule, where egg production varies both across females and among 
clutches within females in a condition-dependent manner.  One expected 
consequence of such plasticity is the phenomenon of “terminal investment” 
(Clutton-Brock 1984).  When a female is in poor condition due to injury or aging 
and her survival prospects are grim, her best strategy may be to increase her 
investment in current reproduction.  For example, females of both insect and bird 
species have been demonstrated to increase egg production as a consequence of 
pathogen or parasite infection (e.g., Bonneaud et al. 2004; Javois and Tammaru 
2004; Polak and Starmer 1998; Shoemaker et al. 2006). 
By providing the right amount of harm, a male may induce a terminal 
response by his mate, manipulating her into siring more progeny with him then 
she would otherwise do.  In Lessells’ (2005) model, females have limited 
flexibility to respond to this form of manipulation.  If male harm is significantly 
damaging, female strategies that avoid manipulation will be selected strongly for. 
Using dynamic programming, I explore how females optimize their lifetime egg 
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allocation, and how selection acts on males to exploit female offspring 
production.  Initially, the model establishes the optimal egg laying behavior of 
females relative to their genetic condition, when females are free to choose mates, 
who will not inflict harm.  Next, direct physical harm to females by their mates is 
introduced.  The model explores under what conditions selection favors male 
harm as well as selective female responses to harm.  Results are discussed with 
respect to the adaptive significance, prevalence and distribution of terminal 
investment by females. 
 
Methods 
Basic structure 
 The objective was to write a program to model the life history of a fertile 
female, allowing her to allocate resources and energy to different features of 
reproduction, particularly mate choice and offspring production.  Females are 
modeled to have multiple discrete reproductive episodes during their lifetime.  In 
essence, the model separates instances where a female has the opportunity to 
choose a mate and reproduce.  Modeling reproductive episodes discretely 
significantly simplifies real life reproduction without much loss of generality as 
many species in nature will mate and reproduce in such a fashion.  Parameters of 
the model can be varied to analyze how females adjust their reproductive 
strategies to maximize their fitness.  In short, the model asks the question- given 
that females reproduce in discrete reproduction bouts, how should females 
allocate their resources between current and future reproduction to maximize 
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fitness? 
 Fundamentally, the model algorithm breaks the female’s reproductive 
strategy into a sequence of decisions, e.g. whether to have another offspring in the 
current clutch or wait for the next clutch.  Fitness is maximized by comparing the 
expected fitness of each specific choice at a decision point.  Thus, a crucial 
element of the model is an accurate measure of female fitness.  Since the model 
incorporates a female preference for male quality, simply counting the number of 
offspring is not enough.  To also take into account the quality of those offspring, 
the number of grandchildren is the basis for the fitness metric. 
 
Condition points and general costs 
 In order to simulate an individual’s finite amount of energy and resources, 
each female is allotted “condition points” in the model.  The number of condition 
points that the female begins with reflects her genetic condition, a measure of her 
predisposition for strong vitality, health, and ability to acquire resources from the 
environment.  All actions for which the female must expend energy or resources 
subtract from her bank of condition points, which is scaled from 0-1000 where 0 
is 100% certainty of death.  The population of males and females is normally 
distributed around 800 points with a standard deviation of 75 points. 
To allow females to express a preference for high quality males, the 
program models mate sampling using the “Best of N” strategy, in which females 
sample N males and choose the most fit of the males sampled (Janetos, 1980).  
Best of N is based on the assumptions that females are proactive in searching for 
 5 
mates and can effectively discern the quality of a male.  The cost of the female’s 
search is modeled as being a near linear function of the number of males she 
samples, minimally influenced by an N
2
 term, since each successive sampling 
costs the female time and energy.  Though these assumptions may be 
simplifications of real world behavior, empirical evidence indicate that many 
species use a form of “Best of N” when searching for mates (e.g., Gibson, 1996; 
Trail and Adams, 1989; Uy et al., 2000). 
At the beginning of each clutch, the female must determine how many 
males to sample by comparing her expected fitness for each possible choice of N.  
The model is only concerned with the genetic condition of the male, which can be 
treated as a random variable, with a normal distribution of mean 800 condition 
points and standard deviation 75.  The maximum of N instances of this random 
variable is the genetic condition of the female’s mate.  The expected value of the 
genetic condition of the female’s mate for different values of N follows, and is 
mainly what is used by the model. 
Producing offspring also costs the female condition points.  The cost of 
each successive offspring in a single reproductive episode is determined by a 
function of the number of offspring already produced during that episode.  The 
function assumes that the cost of the first offspring in a clutch should be less then 
the next few to reflect shared resources of the mother in egg production, gestation 
and/or rearing.  At some point the cost begins to accelerate upwards as the number 
of offspring that the female can produce is limited by her rearing ability and 
physiological constraints.  The high cost of a large clutch gives the female reason 
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to eventually abstain and wait for a future clutch to continue reproducing.  Since 
quantifying the cost of an offspring on such a scale is inevitably imprecise, 
simulations are run using two different offspring cost functions (Fig. 1). 
 
Figure 1: Two functions for the cost of an offspring- in red, (a) f(x)=8+1.5*(x-3)
2
 and in green, (b) 
f(x)=5+(x-4)
2
 where x is the number of offspring already in the current clutch. 
 
Future expectation of survival 
 The probability of survival to future reproductive episodes is crucial in 
determining how the female should balance her allocation of resources between 
present and future reproduction.  A function maps the female’s current condition 
to a probability of surviving until the next reproductive episode.  The value of an 
offspring in the next reproductive episode must be discounted by this factor to 
calculate the current expected value of that offspring.  Survival probability is 
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given by a logistic function, or S-curve.  A logistic function allows the female a 
high probability of survival during the early stages of her life, but has a significant 
drop off when condition becomes low.  The model is run with three different 
functions to characterize a wide variety of living conditions (Fig. 2). 
 
Figure 2: Three functions for the survival probability- in red, (a) f(x)=e
(8x/1000-3)
/(1+e
(8x/1000-3)
), in 
green, (b) f(x)=e
(6x/1000-2)
/(1+e
(6x/1000-2)
) and in blue, (c) f(x)=e
(11x/1000-4)
/(1+e
(11x/1000-4)
) where x is the 
female’s condition. 
 
Dynamic programming algorithm 
 A close examination of the decisions a female must make leads to an 
algorithm for calculating a female's fitness and reproductive strategy.  The 
problem of determining the optimal number of offspring to produce in a given 
clutch can be broken down into repeatedly determining whether to add one more 
offspring to the current clutch.  The female will always produce a first offspring if 
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the cost can be afforded.  The model then asks whether having a second, third, 
fourth, etc. is optimal.  Eventually the answer will be no, and the female will have 
determined the size of her clutch and can move forward to the next episode. 
The factors that determine whether or not the female should add another 
offspring are her current level of condition, the quality of her mate, and the 
number of offspring she has already produced in the current clutch.  Let the term 
“situation” refer to a combination of specific values for these factors.  Whether 
the female adds the offspring or not, her new situation can still be described by 
these three factors after a simple shift of the actual values.  To determine whether 
the offspring is produced or not, the algorithm must compare the fitness values 
that describe each of the new situations.  The set of situations that the female 
could be in is small enough that calculating a fitness value for each combination 
of these factors is feasible.  Given a fitness value to describe every situation, the 
female’s strategy can be extracted.  The difficulty is that the fitness value for a 
given situation is highly dependent on fitness values for other situations, which 
are then dependent on even more situations. 
To work around this difficulty, the algorithm exploits the property that 
condition can only decrease and that the fitness values for many very low 
condition situations do not depend on the fitness values for any other situations.  
These include trivial calculations such as whether the female has just enough 
condition left to produce one more offspring before 100% certainty of death.  If 
fitness values for simple, low condition situations are determined first, 
calculations for more complex situations follow. 
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 The algorithm uses dynamic programming to accomplish the goal of 
describing every situation with a fitness value.  Dynamic programming finds the 
optimal solution to a problem in a bottom-up manner by beginning with trivial 
subproblems and using their solutions to obtain solutions to subproblems of 
increasing complexity, eventually reaching the solution of the original problem 
(Brassard 1996).  Dynamic programming is especially efficient when the 
solutions of subproblems are needed many times because each subproblem 
solution is saved in a data structure so that the calculation only needs to be 
performed once.  This property is the motivation for the implementation of 
dynamic programming in the model’s algorithm.  A fitness value for every 
situation can be calculated by presenting the algorithm with the problem of 
calculating the fitness of the female’s initial situation, as each other situation 
becomes a subproblem. 
 
Implementation 
 As previously mentioned, the algorithm first calculates the fitness for 
trivial situations that would occur late in the female's life.  Fitness values are 
saved in a triple-scripted array with the three dimensions representing the 
combination of factors that make up the situation: number of offspring in the 
current clutch, current condition, and number of males sampled (to reflect the 
quality of her mate).  If the subproblem has the female with no offspring in the 
current clutch and a zero for number of males sampled, then the female has not 
yet found a mate.  Fitness values that would result from situations reflecting each 
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possible choice of N are examined and the maximum of these values is the 
solution to the subproblem.  If the subproblem has the female with no offspring 
and a number of mates sampled greater than zero, then a mate has been chosen.  If 
an offspring is affordable, the subproblem’s solution is the sum of the value of 
that offspring and the fitness value describing the situation where she has had the 
offspring.  If not, then she will never be able to afford an offspring and the fitness 
describing the situation is zero. 
In all other situations, fitness is determined by the decision problem 
described above, where the female decides whether or not to produce one more 
offspring.  If the female chooses not to produce another offspring, her fitness is 
determined by the situation where she has zero offspring in the current clutch, the 
same condition, and has not chosen the number of males to sample.  This must be 
discounted by the probability that she survives to the next episode.  The value to 
consider is:  
A = S(C) * W(0, C, 0)        Eq. 1 
Where A is the fitness value of abstaining, S(C) is the function that gives the 
probability of survival for a given condition, C is the current condition, and W is 
the array of fitness values with the three parameters, current number of offspring, 
current condition, and males sampled.   
If the female chooses to reproduce, her fitness is determined by the sum of 
the contribution of the offspring to her fitness and the fitness for the situation 
where her number of offspring in the current clutch has been incremented by one, 
condition has been decremented by the cost of the offspring, and N is unchanged. 
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The value to consider is:  
R = OF + W(F+1, C – T(F), N)        Eq. 2 
Where R is the fitness value of reproducing, OF is the contribution of this 
offspring to the female’s fitness, F is the number of offspring in the current clutch, 
N is the number of males sampled, and T(F) is the function that gives the cost of 
the next offspring for a clutch of size F.  The fitness value describing the female’s 
current situation is the maximum of A and R.   
By this procedure, a fitness value can be calculated for every situation.  
The array of these fitness values serves as an abstract description of the female’s 
optimal reproductive strategy because her best action in any situation can be 
determined by comparing values in the array.  For instance, to determine how 
many offspring the female should produce in her first reproductive episode, we 
can use the procedure outlined above and plug in values from the array.  Again the 
decision is broken down into repeated simpler decisions of whether to add one 
more offspring, a question which is equivalent to asking whether R is greater than 
A.  When A is greater than R, the female abstains to the next clutch, and the 
number of times the decision was repeated gives the number of offspring the 
female should produce in the clutch. 
 This procedure can be extended further to determine optimal decisions 
throughout the female’s life.  Starting the female at her initial level of condition 
and stepping through her decisions while carefully tracking her situation outputs 
an optimal path for the female’s life.  Potentially stochastic elements, such as the 
genetic condition of males that the female samples, can be made random and 
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changes in this optimal course can be observed as the female encounters different 
sets of situations. 
 However, a female’s lifetime reproductive strategy may contain anomalies 
due to the accuracy with which the model allows her to make decisions.  For 
example, her late life decisions may revolve around guaranteeing that she has the 
exact amount of condition she needs to produce a certain number of offspring in 
her last clutch.  To introduce error into the female’s foresight and smooth out the 
behavioral anomalies, the actual calculations examine a weighted average of the 
condition levels surrounding the situation she would find herself in after an action 
such as producing an offspring. 
As a point of comparison for the strategies where females can facultatively 
allocate resources at each reproductive bout, the model has another mode where 
females cannot adapt their offspring production numbers to their situation and 
must produce a constant number of offspring every clutch.  The algorithm is 
similar in this mode, except that the comparison of A and R is eliminated since the 
female cannot produce any more offspring than her quota nor can she abstain 
before her clutch size has reached it.  To determine this quota of offspring that the 
female should produce at every clutch, the female’s fitness is calculated for all 
possible values.  The quota corresponding to the maximum fitness value is the 
female’s optimal clutch size. 
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Value of offspring 
The female’s offspring are assumed to have a genetic condition equal to 
the average of the female and her mate’s genetic conditions.  Mapping the 
offspring’s genetic condition to a value measuring the contribution of that 
offspring to the female’s fitness is crucial to determining the optimal number of 
offspring for the female to have each clutch.  To calculate a value for female 
offspring, the model uses the same algorithm described above from the offspring’s 
perspective.  For each value of genetic condition, the model runs the algorithm, 
simply substituting a one for the value of an offspring, which in effect, counts the 
number of expected grandchildren for the original female.  The algorithm 
produces a fitness value for every potential level of genetic condition for female 
offspring.  These values are then normalized to one by dividing each value by the 
population average. 
 Because the algorithm cannot quantify male fitness, a range of estimates 
are used to map a male offspring’s genetic condition to a contribution to the 
female’s fitness.  Three factors contribute to how many grandchildren the female 
can expect her male offspring to sire: the expected number of opportunities to be 
sampled by a female, probability of selection in a competition with other males, 
and expected number of offspring a female would produce during a mating.  Of 
these factors, the model can only easily obtain a measure of the male’s probability 
of selection in a competition with other males.  The mapping of the male’s genetic 
condition to a contribution value starts with the probability that the male would be 
chosen over another random male and multiples it by a function of the male’s 
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condition.  Two different functions are used to add breadth (Fig. 3).  Again the 
values are then normalized. 
 
Figure 3: Two functions for the male offspring factor- in red, (a) f(x)=1+(x-800)
3
/4x10
7
 and in 
green,(b)  f(x)=1+(x-800)
3
/2.5x10
7
 where x is the male offspring’s condition. 
 
Introduction of male harm 
 To explore how male harm influences female reproductive strategies, the 
model has an option to give males the ability to harm their mates if doing so will 
improve the male’s fitness.  Harm is implemented as a subtraction from the 
female's current condition and represents any type of direct physical harm.  When 
the female first chooses a male to mate with, the algorithm compares the optimal 
number of offspring for the female to produce if she begins the clutch at her 
current level of condition with the optimal number of offspring for her to produce 
if she begins the clutch at a number of lower levels of condition.  If she will have 
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more offspring at a lower level of condition, the male can inflict enough harm so 
that she begins the clutch at the lower level of condition where she will produce 
more offspring. 
However, there must be a limit to how much harm a male should be 
willing to inflict for each additional offspring.  To explore this complex situation 
in depth, three different functions are used to map the number of condition points 
the male must subtract from the female to the number of offspring he must gain to 
be willing to inflict that much harm (Fig. 4).  As the cost of inflicting harm 
decreases, the prevalence of male harm increases. 
 
 
Figure 4: Three functions for the cost of male harm- in red, (a) f(x)=x
2
/5000+x/300, in green, (b) 
f(x)=x
2
/1000+x/600 and in blue, (c) f(x)=x
2
/2000+x/1200 where x is the condition points 
subtracted from the female and f(x) is the number of additional offspring the male would need to 
sire to be willing to inflict that level of harm. 
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 With the introduction of male harm, two additional modes of the model 
arise.  The first has males inflicting harm upon females that do not expect it.  To 
analyze this scenario, females must make decisions based on a model without 
harm.  The algorithm first runs the facultative mode in the absence of male harm 
to fill an array with fitness values for all situations.  When a female must decide 
how to act, she compares the fitness values of what she expects the resulting 
situations to be from the array without harm.  However, her choice is then 
examined in light of harmful males and the actual corresponding fitness value. 
 The second additional mode allows females to see that males are harmful.  
No further adjustments to the algorithm are necessary to accommodate this. 
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Data 
Condition 650   Condition 725   Condition 800   
Fitness 12.59   Fitness 18.94   Fitness 27.26   
Clutch N Offspring Clutch N Offspring Clutch N Offspring 
1 4.23 6  1 3 5  1 2.04 5  
2 6.16 7  2 3.99 6  2 2.47 5  
3 15.4 10  3 5.77 7  3 3.01 6  
4 1 0.18  4 16 10  4 4.18 6.68  
    5 1 0.23  5 9.24 10.9  
        6 1 0.31  
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Typical output of the facultative mode of the model, where there is no 
male harm and clutch size can vary.  The output includes a fitness value, the 
number of clutches, and N and offspring numbers for each clutch.  There are 5 
different levels of genetic condition using the (a) offspring cost function, (a) 
survival probability function, and (a) male offspring factor. 
 
Condition 875   Condition 950   
Fitness 37.36   Fitness 48.58   
Clutch N Offspring Clutch N Offspring 
1 2 5  1 1.92 4.92  
2 2 5  2 2 5  
3 2 5  3 2 5  
4 2.18 5.18  4 2 5  
5 2.92 6.14  5 2 5  
6 4.77 7.56  6 2.07 6  
7 10.5 8.6  7 3.13 6.49  
8 0.97 2.18  8 8.05 10.6  
    9 3.71 1.75  
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Figure 5: Number of offspring in each clutch plotted against the female’s 
condition pre-clutch.  There are 5 different levels of genetic condition using the 
(a) offspring cost function, (a) survival probability function, and (a) male 
offspring factor. 
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Figure 6: The number of offspring a female with genetic, condition 800 would 
have if she began a clutch at each level of condition  using the (a) offspring cost 
function, (a) survival probability function, and (a) male offspring factor. 
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 Constant Facultative 
Harm No 
Reaction 
Harm   
Reaction 
650 11.920 12.600 11.717 12.443 
725 17.946 18.937 18.184 18.778 
800 26.149 27.245 25.059 26.880 
875 35.850 37.395 32.944 36.706 
950 47.165 48.599 44.450 46.536 
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Figure 7: Mean fitness values (± standard error) under the four different modes of 
the model for different levels of genetic condition using the (a) offspring cost 
function, (a) survival probability function, (a) male offspring factor, and (a) harm 
cost function.  “Constant” refers to females that can only produce a fixed, 
constant number of offspring each clutch.  “Facultative” refers to females that 
will adjust offspring production in the absence of male harm.  “Harm No 
Reaction” refers to females that will adjust offspring production without 
expecting male harm, but do face male harm.  “Harm Reaction” refers to females 
that will adjust offspring production, expecting that males will harm. 
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 Constant Facultative 
Harm No 
Reaction 
Harm   
Reaction 
650 11.920 12.600 11.362 12.447 
725 17.946 18.937 17.920 18.746 
800 26.149 27.245 21.289 26.846 
875 35.850 37.395 29.344 33.298 
950 47.165 48.599 32.508 43.081 
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Figure 8: Mean fitness values (± standard error) under the four different modes 
of the model for different levels of genetic condition using the (a) offspring cost 
function, (a) survival probability function, (a) male offspring factor, and (b) harm 
cost function. 
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 Constant Facultative 
Harm No 
Reaction 
Harm   
Reaction 
650 11.920 12.600 10.787 12.353 
725 17.946 18.937 14.659 17.275 
800 26.149 27.245 19.440 25.480 
875 35.850 37.395 25.076 30.462 
950 47.165 48.599 28.625 41.742 
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Figure 9: Mean fitness values (± standard error) under the four different modes of 
the model for different levels of genetic condition using the (a) offspring cost 
function, (a) survival probability function, (a) male offspring factor, and (c) harm 
cost function. 
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Figure 10: Mean fitness values (± standard error) at genetic condition 800 under 
the four different modes of the model, compared using the (a) offspring cost 
function, (a) survival probability function, (a) male offspring factor, and all three 
harm cost functions. 
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Results 
Throughout all of the data shown, the (a) offspring cost function, (a) survival 
probability function, and (a) male offspring factor are used.  However, all of the 
combinations of the functions produced qualitatively similar data. 
The model consistently shows that when decreasing condition results in lower 
probabilities of survival, the optimal reproductive strategy includes pacing 
reproductive effort initially and then investing more heavily late in life (i.e. 
terminal investment).  Table 1 demonstrates the large increase in preference and 
offspring production in the later clutches.  For each condition, there is a final 
clutch where the female has a small number of offspring.  Usually this reflects a 
situation in the model where the female has aimed to produce a high number of 
offspring in her final clutch to use up the last of her condition points, but has 
slightly miscalculated so that she has some left over for another offspring if she 
survives to the next clutch. 
The data also shows that this terminal investment appears exploitable by 
males.  Figure 5 shows that females of all genetic conditions will terminally invest 
at approximately the same point- around condition 400 under these parameters.  
Females in this state are most vulnerable to male manipulation via harm.  In 
addition, the increase in offspring production can occur as a sudden spike as seen 
in (Fig. 6), presenting males with significant motivation to harm when a female’s 
condition is just greater than the point of the spike. 
When males are able to inflict calculated harm upon their mates, the female’s 
fitness suffers significantly.  Males are able to pinpoint conditions where females 
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will increase offspring production and inflict enough harm to reap the benefits.  
The effect of this harm can be seen in figures 7-10, and becomes more damaging 
to the female’s fitness as the cost of inflicting harm decreases. 
In the harm reaction mode, females will attempt to avoid beginning a clutch at 
certain conditions where they are more susceptible to heavy blows of harm.  For 
example, in figure 6 we see that the difference between a female beginning at 
condition 435 and 420 is about four offspring.  The female is clearly in danger of 
being harmed when close to this jump in offspring production.  Suppose the 
female is at condition 500.  If sampling 6 mates would have been optimal in the 
absence of harm, she could do so and begin her clutch at 470.  However, she 
would be harmed 50 more points to bring her to 420.  If she instead samples 16 
mates, she will begin her clutch at 420 and the male will not benefit from 
harming.  In the second case, the female gains the advantage of mating with a 
higher quality male on average, making the best of her bad situation.  Figures 7-
10 present the obvious result that females that expect harm will have greater 
fitness than those that do not. 
Nevertheless, the fitness values that result from this strategy are exceeded in 
many cases by those for females that simply produce a fixed and constant number 
of offspring during each clutch.  The data shows (Fig. 7-9) that as the female’s 
genetic condition increases and the cost of inflicting harm decreases, producing a 
constant clutch size becomes a better strategy than attempting to avoid the harm 
in other ways.  Even when the female’s genetic condition is low and the cost of 
inflicting harm is high, the difference between the two strategies is small. 
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Discussion 
 Sexual conflict theory predicts that male harm to females only arise as a 
pleiotropic by-product of another adaptive function (e.g. sperm competitiveness; 
Arngqvist and Rowe 2005).  This is because when males harm females they risk 
decreasing their own reproductive success.  As such, any males bearing alleles 
that accomplish the competitive fertilization benefit without the incidental harm to 
mates will be at an advantage.  Alternatively, males can directly inflict harm to 
females if this provides them with a direct advantage, and theoretical models have 
shown this to be possible (Johnstone and Keller 2000; Lessels 1999, 2005). 
However, the conditions under which direct male harm evolves may be restrictive 
or rare.  Here the model examines the adaptive significance of harm under 
conditions of serial monogamy, but with no sperm competition, which is 
consistent with the results of Lessels (2005).  The results indicate that males will 
evolve to harm their mates to take advantage of female terminal investment 
strategies.  That is, if females facultatively adjust their investment in particular 
clutches based on their condition and invest more heavily when their condition is 
low, then males should harm females to reduce their condition and elicit a 
terminal investment response.  This way, males sire more offspring than they 
would have if the female’s condition had been higher. 
These results lead to a unique conclusion of the model- that male harm 
should be exclusively or preferentially directed at older females and/or females in 
poor condition.  Females offer the most significant benefit to male harm when 
they are near the brink of a terminal investment point and a male can push them 
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over the edge.  In the model, healthy, young females are much less likely to 
respond to harm with an increase in reproductive effort.  Currently, experiments 
have been conducted only with healthy, young females (e.g. Morrow et al. 2003, 
Rice 1996).  Therefore, negative results from empirical studies may be an artifact 
of using young and healthy females. 
 In the face of male harm, the results indicate two evolutionarily adaptive 
responses by females.  Recall that male harm in the model is adaptive and plastic, 
only occurring when the male perceives a benefit in increased egg production.  
First, females can behaviorally modify their egg production schedules and mate 
choice strategy in such a way that they (1) minimize the probability of remating at 
a time when they are most vulnerable to males exploiting their terminal 
investment response and (2) maximize the indirect benefits of mate choice in the 
face of inevitable direct costs.  This is the result of the “harm reaction” mode of 
the model, where females were able to recoup a significant portion of the fitness 
that male harm had previously detracted.  Second, females can forego the terminal 
investment response altogether, and in so doing, remove the opportunity for male 
exploitation.  This is the “constant” mode of the model, where females were also 
able to achieve fitness levels slightly under a facultative egg production schedule 
in the absence of harm. 
 The first evolutionary response by females – sophisticated modulation of 
egg production to minimize the probability of male harm – seems a less likely 
evolutionary outcome than the second.  Such modulation would require an honest 
and reliable signaling system and relies on males harming with complete 
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discretion and precision.  That is, males and females would clearly decide how to 
maximize and reduce harm, and adjust their behavior accordingly.  Alternatively, 
the strategy of simply forgoing the ability to facultatively adjust clutches for each 
mating bout allows females to avoid harm since the benefits of harm for males are 
no longer present.  If true, then this model generates two predictions.  First, if 
conflict between sexes is common so that terminal investment by females is 
vulnerable to male manipulation and the loss of terminal investment is an 
effective female response to such manipulation, then terminal investment by 
females should be uncommon.  Although the phenomenon of terminal investment 
makes intuitive sense, examples from nature are relatively rare (e.g., Bonneaud et 
al., 2004; Clutton-Brock, 1984).  This paucity in empirical data may be due to an 
insufficient number of studies searching for terminal investment in nature, or, as 
our model predicts, terminal investment being indeed uncommon because of 
sexual conflict.  Second, terminal investment should occur at higher frequency 
among monogamous species, where male harm is never adaptive, than among 
polygamous species.  In light of the model’s results, future empirical work should 
test for patterns of female terminal investment and the intensity of sexual conflict. 
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